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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
THE STATE OF UTAH,

Plaintiff/Appellee
v.
ADAM ZAKARIAAHMED,

Defendant/Appellant.
Appellant is not incarcerated
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT

INTRODUCTION

As required by Utah Rule of Appellate Procedure 24( c), this reply brief is
"limited to answering any new matter set forth in the opposing brief." The brief
does not restate arguments from the opening brief or address matters that do not
merit reply.
Ahmed makes two principal arguments on appeal. First, he contends that
the trial court erred when it recognized a surveillance-location privilege under
Utah law. Second, he contends that insufficient evidence existed to support the
verdict against him. Success on either argument warrants reversal. The State's
brief responds to both of Ahmed's contentions on appeal. Ahmed's opening brief
(OB) adequately addresses the State's response to the sufficiency argument. See
OB 41-53. Thus, in keeping with rule 24, this reply brief addresses only the
State's arguments as they apply to the surveillance-location privilege issue.
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The State first contends that this Court should not consider the merits of
Ahmed's argument that the trial court erred when it recognized a surveillancelocation privilege under Utah law. Specifically, the State argues that Ahmed did
not challenge each basis of trial court's ruling as it pertained to the privilege issue
and thus claims that this Court may not consider the merits of the surveillancelocation-privilege issue. However, despite the State's contention to the contrary,
and for the reasons explained below, Ahmed did challenge each basis of the trial
court's ruling. As such, this Court should rule on the merits of Ahmed's
surveillance-location-privilege argument and reverse.

~

The State next contends that Ahmed did not raise a constitutional error
below and thus may not assert the harmless-beyond-a-reasonable-doubt
prejudice standard on appeal. However, as explained below, and as Ahmed's
opening brief and the record on appeal establish, Ahmed preserved the
constitutional issue that entitles him to the more deferential standard on appeal.
Finally, Ahmed contends that this Court may make a default ruling in his
favor and reverse on the surveillance-location-privilege issue because the State
took the considerable risk that it would prevail on its procedural arguments alone
and did not brief the substantive merits of that issue. The State took the same risk
when it argued that Ahmed is not entitled to the harmless-beyond-a-reasonabledoubt prejudice standard, but did not make any argument as to why the
constitutional error was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
~
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ARGUMENT
Gr)

I.

Because Ahmed's opening brief addressed each basis of the trial
court's ruling suppressing the disclosure of the police's
surveillance location this Court should consider the merits of his
surveillance-location privilege argument.
The State contends that Ahmed failed to challenge the trial court's ruling

that not disclosing the surveillance location from which Officer Telles supposedly
observed Ahmed engaging in hand-to-hand drug transactions constituted a
reasonable limit on cross-examination. State's Brief (SB) 11, 12-15. As such, the
State argues that this Court may not consider the merits of Ahmed's appeal as it
relates to the surveillance-location privilege issue. The State is wrong because
Ahmed's opening brief addresses the trial court's contention that not disclosing
the surveillance location constitutes a reasonable limit on cross-examination.
Li)

Ahmed's opening brief, on page 36, specifically addresses the trial court's
ruling that not disclosing the surveillance location constitutes a reasonable limit
of cross-examination:
... [T]he trial court decided that location was not a relevant area for
cross examination because Officer Telles' "statement alone that his
view was unobstructed is sufficient and not challenged in such a
fashion that would require disclosure of-of the location." R.688;
R.283-284 ("I don't find that the location of the area that office
observed to be that material"). The trial court was incorrect.
OB36.
The opening brief then goes on to explain why the trial court's ruling was
incorrect and caused prejudice. The trial court's ruling did not constitute a limit
on cross-examination but rather functioned as a complete bar to Ahmed's ability

3
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to effectively impeach, through cross-examination, Officer Telles' testimony as it
pertained to his observations from the secret surveillance location. See id. The
opening brief explained that without access to the specific surveillance location
Ahmed could not "cross-examine the officer on specific obstacles, reflections,
shadows, or other visual impairments." Id. In other words, obstacles, reflections,
shadows, or other visual impairments that might have been unique to the specific
location may not have been reproducible from the approximate location, thus the
trial court's ruling did not constitute a reasonable limit of cross-examination.
Accordingly, for the reasons discussed above, the opening brief explained that the
trial court's ruling did not constitute a reasonable limit on cross-examination
because it effectively denied Ahmed access to potentially exculpatory evidence,
which he could have used to impeach Officer Telles' testimony.
Accordingly, because Ahmed's opening brief specifically addressed the trial
court's ruling as it related to the reasonable limits of cross-examination, the
State's argument on this point fails. As such, this Court should consider the
merits of Ahmed's surveillance-location privilege argument and reverse.
Moreover, for the reasons stated in opening, this Court should reverse because
the trial court erred in recognizing a non-existent surveillance-location privilege
under Utah law, and the error was prejudicial. See OB 15-40.

4
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II.

Ahmed preserved his constitutional right-to-present-a-defense
claim and, having established constitutional error, is entitled to
the harmless-beyond-a-reasonable-doubt prejudice standard on
appeal.
"In order to preserve an issue for appeal[,] the issue must be presented to

Ga

the [trial] court in such a way that the [trial] court has an opportunity to rule on
that issue." In re Baby Girl T., 2012 UT 78, ,r 34, 298 P.3d 1251 (first alteration in
original) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). "For an issue to be
sufficiently raised, even if indirectly, it must at least be raised to a level of
consciousness such that the trial judge can consider it." Id. (emphasis in original)
(brackets, internal quotation marks, and citation omitted). For the reasons
explained below, Ahmed sufficiently preserved his right-to-present-a-defense
claim.
The State contends that Ahmed did not preserve his right-to-present-adefense claim and thus is not entitled to the harmless-beyond-a-reasonabledoubt standard for showing prejudice on appeal. SB. at 15. Specifically, the State
argues that Ahmed's "due process" argument below, taken in context, "was
referring to the due process right to exculpatory evidence under rule 16 and

Brady," and that Ahmed's argument "was not referring to the right to present a
defense." SB at 19. In other words, the State claims that Ahmed did not use the
magic words, "the right to present a defense," and so did not specifically raise the
issue in a manner that allowed the trial court to rule on it. For the reasons
explained below, the State is wrong.

5
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

&i

In In re Baby Girl T., the Utah Supreme Court explained that though the
appellant in that case "failed to expressly articulate the due process clause as the
basis of his constitutional claim, [it would] not penalize him for failing to use the
magic words 'due process' when the record clearly demonstrates his argument
was founded in the due process clause." 2012 UT 78, ,r 33. Here, though Ahmed
did not use the magic words, "the right to present a defense," the record "clearly
demonstrates his argument was founded" in that right. See id.
In support of his motion to arrest judgment, Ahmed argued before the trial
court that he needed access to Officer Telles' surveillance location because it had
the potential to produce "relevant exculpatory information that [he] wanted to be
able to present to the jury." R.677; see also R.260, 261 (making the same
argument during a pre-trial motion). Ahmed's argument clearly implicates his
right to present a defense because he explains he intended to present relevant
exculpatory evidence gained from the surveillance location to the jury. Ahmed's
argument recognizes what the State fails to, that the right to exculpatory evidence
is part and parcel of the right to present a defense. U.S. v. Odeh, 815 F.3d 968,
977 (6th Cir. 2016) ("[A] defendant's right to present a defense generally includes
the right to the admission of competent, reliable, exculpatory evidence." (citation
and internal quotation marks omitted)); see also Johnson v. Oklahoma, 484 U.S.
878, 881 (1987) (Marshall, J., dissenting from the denial of certiorari) ("By
denying petitioner the chance to obtain potentially conclusive exculpatory
evidence, ... [the trial court] deprived petitioner of a meaningful opportunity to
6
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~

present a defense."). Accordingly, when Ahmed asserted, on multiple occasions,
0j

that his right to due process entitled him to relevant, exculpatory evidence, he
adequately preserved his right-to-present-a-defense claim. See R.54, 260, 261,
679-681, and 684.
In sum, having preserved the constitutional issue for appeal, upon showing
error, Ahmed is then entitled to the harmless-beyond-a-reasonable prejudice
standard on appeal. See Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967); see also
U.S. v. Markey, 393 F.3d 1132, 1135 (10th Cir. 2004) (stating the harmless0P

beyond-a-reasonable-doubt prejudice standard applies to right-to-present-adefense claims); State v. Villarreal, 889 P.2d 419, 425 (Utah 1995). Finally,
because the State has failed to demonstrate that the constitutional error below

01

was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, this Court may reverse. In any event,
even if this Court declines to apply the harmless-beyond-a-reasonable-doubt
prejudice standard, Ahmed has nevertheless shown prejudice. See OB 34-40.

III.

This Court may make a default ruling in Ahmed's favor because
the State failed to brief the surveillance-location privilege issue
on the merits and failed to argue that the trial court's
constitutional error below was not harmless beyond a
reasonable doubt.
"[A]n appellee who fails to respond to the merits of an appellant's

argument will risk default." State v. Roberts, 2015 UT 24, ,r 20, 345 P.3d 1226. In

State v. Roberts, the State did not address the merits of each of the defendant's
claims and instead, with respect to two of the defendant's claims, relied solely on
the argument that the claims were inadequately briefed. Id. ,r 20. The Utah
7
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Supreme Court explained that though it chose not to, it "could have defaulted the
State for its failure to argue the substance of the issues." Id.; see also Broderick v.

Apartment Mgmt. Consultants, L.L.C., 2012 UT 17, ,r 19, 279 P .3d 391 (holding in
favor of appellant where appellee failed to address the merits of appellant's
arguments).
In the opening brief, Ahmed conducts an extensive analysis of Utah
privilege law, argues that a surveillance-location privilege does not exist under

~

Utah law, and demonstrates that the trial court erred in recognizing such a
privilege. OB 15-31. Had Ahmed failed to raise the issue he would have risked
waiving the argument before the appellate court. See State v. Johnson, 2017 UT
76, ,r 16, 416 P .3d 443. Or, had Ahmed raised the issue but neglected to
adequately brief it, it would have been within the discretion of the appellate court
to not consider it. See State v. Timmerman, 2009 UT 58, ,r 25 n.5, 218 P .3d 590.
Though the State's burden on appeal differs from that of an appellant in a
criminal case, the briefing requirements for each are the same. Roberts, 2015 UT
24, ,r 19. Here, the State failed to argue the substance of the surveillance-location
privilege issue presented on appeal. Rather, the State argues only that this Court
should not reach the issue. SB 12-15. Where the State's procedural argument has
failed, see supra 3-4, and where the State has failed to argue the merits of
Ahmed's overarching contention on appeal, this Court may default "the State for
its failure to argue the substance of the issues." See Roberts, 2015 UT 24, ,r 20. As
such, this Court may reverse.
8
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Further because Ahmed has established that an error of constitutional
~

magnitude occurred below, see OB 32-40, the prejudice burden shifted to the
State to show that the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. See

Chapman, 386 U.S. at 24; see also Villarreal, 889 P.2d at 425. Though the State
made the argument that Ahmed cannot establish prejudice on this record, see SB
20-23, that is not Ahmed's burden here. While Ahmed contests the State's
argument, the State attempting to show Ahmed suffered no prejudice is not the
same thing as establishing, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the trial court's error
was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
The State argues that Ahmed had the burden to show the existence of
actual obstructions that might have impaired Officer Telles' observations of
lj

Ahmed. The State's argument assumes that only physical obstructions, such as
trees, would have impaired his view and that Ahmed had the burden to try to
discern which trees may have done so. But, as Ahmed's opening brief establishes,
he was not concerned about only physical obstructions to Officer Telles' view but
also other non-physical visual impairments such as reflections (e.g., in the
particular window through which Officer Telles was observing) or shadows.
Unlike physical obstructions, visual impairments cannot be guessed at except
from a specific vantage point.
In any event, because Ahmed succeeded in shifting the burden to show
prejudice to the State, the State needs to establish, beyond a reasonable doubt
that Officer Telles' had an unobstructed, non-physical visual-impairment-free
9
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view of Ahmed, and the State has not done so here. Beyond making the standard

~

prejudice argument, the State has failed to meet its burden to show the trial
court's error in recognizing a smveillance-location privilege was harmless beyond
a reasonable doubt. As such, this Court may reverse the trial court because the
State failed to meet its burden on appeal. See Roberts 2015 UT 24, ,i 20.

In sum, because the State failed to argue the merits of Ahmed's
~

smveillance-location privilege argument, this Court may make a default ruling in
Ahmed's favor and reverse the trial court. See id. In addition, this Court may rule
in Ahmed's favor and reverse on the basis that the State failed to meet its burden
on appeal to show that the constitutional error committed below was harmless
beyond a reasonable doubt.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons above and in the opening brief, this Court should reverse.
SUBMITTED this

J nd dayof July, 2018.

~

~

4i1I
10

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

(;j

CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE
In compliance with the type-volume limitation of Utah R App. P. 24(f)(1), I
certify that this brief contains 2329 words, excluding the table of contents, table
of authorities, addenda, and certificates of compliance and delivery. In
compliance with the typeface requirements of Utah R App. P. 27(b), I certify that
this brief has been prepared in a proportionally spaced font using Microsoft
Word 2010 in Georgia 13 point.

In compliance with rule 21(g), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, and rule
4-202.09(9)(A), Utah Code of Judicial Administration, I certify that, upon

information and belief, all non-public information has been omitted from the

foregoing brief of defendant/appellant. )

,

t,,_

C /.

~CARLM
~

~

11

~

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY
I, SARAH CARLQUIST, hereby certify that I have caused to be handdelivered an original and five copies of the foregoing to the Utah Court of
Appeals, 450 South State Street, 5 th Floor, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114; and three
copies to the Utah Attorney General's Office, 160 East 300 South, 6 th Floor, PO
Box 140854, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114. I have also caused a searchable pdf to be
emailed to the Utah Court of Appeals at courtofappea1s@utcourts.gov and a copy
emailed to the Utah Attorney General's Office at criminalappeals@agutah.gov,
pursuant to Utah Supreme Court Standing Order No.

11,

this ;;) t1d

2018

s

DELIVERED this

Z

day of July, 2018.

12

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

day of July,

